Prof. Eldrid Jordaan|Published
As tensions between Pretoria and Washington deepen, South Africa faces urgent questions about its dependence on American technology and its ability to maintain essential public services should access be restricted.
On 9 October 2026, US President Donald Trump’s administration imposed sweeping sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC), just hours after South African jurist and former ICC judge Justice Navi Pillay was announced as the recipient of the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize for her contributions to international justice and the rule of law.
The sanctions extended restrictions beyond individual judges and prosecutors to the institution itself, affecting its financial and commercial relationships and potentially restricting access to American technology providers. Although certain software and telecommunications services remain exempt, the precedent is significant.
An international institution established through a multilateral treaty can find its operational independence compromised by dependence on foreign-controlled technological infrastructure.
For South Africa, this raises a fundamental question: How prepared is our government if geopolitical tensions result in restrictions on the American technologies underpinning essential public services?
Relations between South Africa and the United States have become increasingly strained over foreign policy, international justice and geopolitical alignment, particularly South Africa’s proceedings against Israel before the International Court of Justice.
There is no evidence that Washington intends to impose equivalent technological sanctions on South Africa. Nevertheless, responsible national planning requires governments to anticipate systemic vulnerabilities before they become crises.
American technology companies occupy dominant positions in critical segments of global enterprise computing, including operating systems, cloud infrastructure, cybersecurity, databases and digital communications.
Microsoft, Amazon, Google and Oracle provide technologies widely used across public and private institutions.
The concern is not their nationality, but the concentration of critical dependencies within companies subject to foreign jurisdiction.
When essential public services depend on technologies that can be restricted through geopolitical decisions, technological dependency becomes a matter of national sovereignty.
Consider the consequences if government departments were unable to renew software licences, access cloud infrastructure, receive cybersecurity updates or obtain technical support from major American technology providers.
Could SARS continue processing tax information? Would SASSA maintain uninterrupted grant administration? Could Home Affairs, public hospitals and municipalities sustain essential digital services?
These questions do not suggest that these institutions would necessarily cease functioning. Their exposure depends on existing infrastructure, contractual arrangements and business continuity capabilities.
However, without a comprehensive government-wide technology dependency assessment, we cannot confidently determine the extent of our vulnerability.
That uncertainty should concern policymakers, business leaders and citizens alike.
My academic research into digital sovereignty is informed by my experience founding GovChat, a South African public interest technology platform developed to strengthen communication between citizens and government.
During COVID 19, GovChat facilitated access to essential services, including social grants and health information.
Yet our dependence on WhatsApp exposed a fundamental vulnerability.
When Meta threatened GovChat’s continued access to its platform, we confronted the reality that technology developed for public purposes could remain dependent on infrastructure controlled by a multinational corporation.
The GovChat versus Meta dispute concerned private platform power and competition law, whereas the ICC sanctions involve state authority and international relations.
Nevertheless, both illustrate a common structural problem.
An institution can own its application, control its data and possess legal authority to deliver services, yet remain dependent on infrastructure governed elsewhere.
This distinction is central to my research on digital sovereignty in the platform economy.
South Africa has already taken steps towards strengthening its sovereign digital infrastructure. The CSIR’s Sebowa Cloud, developed through the National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System, provides locally operated computing and storage capabilities using open-source technologies. President Cyril Ramaphosa specifically highlighted Sebowa during the July 2026 Google Cloud Summit as an example of government’s investment in domestic cloud infrastructure.
While these developments are encouraging, the existence of a locally operated cloud platform does not automatically establish government’s readiness to withstand foreign technology sanctions. The critical question remains whether such infrastructure has the capacity, interoperability and operational maturity to support essential government services if access to major international technology providers is restricted.
My research examines sovereignty across political, data, technological, infrastructural and platform dimensions.
I argue that these must be complemented by operational sovereignty: the capacity of a state to maintain essential public services when externally controlled technological infrastructure becomes unavailable.
This distinction separates legal ownership of digital assets from the practical capability to sustain public services independently.
South Africa urgently needs a coordinated assessment of technological exposure across critical public institutions.
SITA, National Treasury and the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies should identify essential systems, foreign supplier dependencies, jurisdictional risks and credible continuity alternatives.
Public procurement must incorporate interoperability, supplier diversification, data portability and contingency planning.
Government should also invest in domestic technical expertise, secure open-source alternatives and sovereign infrastructure where economically and technically justified.
This is not an argument for excluding American technology companies. International partnerships remain essential to innovation, investment and economic growth.
Rather, South Africa must pursue managed technological interdependence, ensuring that no single supplier or jurisdiction becomes an irreplaceable point of failure.
The ICC sanctions demonstrate that technological infrastructure is increasingly inseparable from geopolitical power.
The GovChat experience showed me that dependency often becomes visible only when access is threatened.
South Africa should not wait for a comparable crisis before assessing the resilience of its public sector digital infrastructure.
Our sovereignty cannot be measured only by the independence of our political decisions or the location of our government data. It must also be measured by our ability to continue governing when access to foreign controlled technology is threatened.
That is the real test of digital sovereignty.
And South Africa must prepare for it now.
*Prof. Eldrid Jordaan is the Founder of GovChat and author of The Silicon Empire vs Social Impact.
**The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL
