This story was originally published at The New Arab, where it was edited by Charlie Hoyle.
Analysis: Trump’s midterm defeat, Netanyahu’s weakened position, and renewed diplomatic efforts have increased the political cost of continuing the Iran war
The political cost of continuing the US-Israel war on Iran has increased exponentially for President Donald Trump. The Republicans’ crushing midterm defeat turned an already unpopular war into an electoral liability, while developments in Congress, Israel, regional diplomacy, and Tehran raised the stakes of further escalation. Trump recently adopted a softer tone, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio said major combat operations are unnecessary for now.
Whether this signals a genuine diplomatic opening or a tactical pause remains unclear. More important are five developments reshaping the calculations behind another attack.
The crushing Republican defeat
For months, Americans opposed a war that international legal experts characterized as illegal. A March poll found 59 percent considered the decision to attack Iran wrong; by August, just 31 percent supported the war. Yet public opposition had little apparent impact on Trump’s course. The midterms finally gave voters a chance to deliver their verdict at the ballot box.
The election became, in significant part, a referendum on the war and its economic consequences. Republicans lost both chambers amid rising energy prices and broader frustration with Trump’s policies. That assessment comes from the administration itself. Trump acknowledged the war contributed to Republican losses. Vice President JD Vance was blunter, writing on X: “The reason we lost is the war. The president himself said so last night.”
Iran sought to make Americans feel the war’s economic costs by disrupting global energy markets. Tehran now sees the electoral backlash as vindication of that strategy. Other issues also shaped the election, but unlike unfavourable polls, the Republican defeat imposed a political price Trump cannot ignore.
The Democratic blue tsunami
The massive Democratic election victory transformed the party’s anti-war agenda almost overnight. Progressive and democratic socialist successes strengthened its anti-war wing, pushing cautious leaders toward more forceful opposition. Democrats now have a powerful electoral mandate to challenge the war and, beginning in January, control of Congress.
The shift is evident at the top. Centrist House Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries vowed to end the war after the election and, within days, went from withholding support for Pete Hegseth’s impeachment to a “hard yes.”
Democrats cannot unilaterally end the war, but they have immense legislative and political power to obstruct its continuation. Their strongest weapon is Congress’s power of the purse.
In 1973, Congress cut funding for US military operations in Vietnam, helping end American involvement in the war. Democrats could pursue the same strategy: make a ban on funding the Iran war a condition of funding the federal government. They can also haul senior Trump officials and military commanders before Congress, grill them under oath over alleged war crimes like the Minab school bombing, and investigate mass civilian casualties. Public hearings could expose the war’s human toll and sharply raise the political cost of an already unpopular war.
“Democrats should start by upholding US laws that restrict arms transfers over human rights abuses, whether the recipient is a friend or a foe,” Nancy Okail, president of the Center for International Policy, told The New Arab.
“They should abandon performative diplomacy and rebuild the trust needed for serious negotiations aimed at resolving conflicts. That requires a willingness to address the causes of war and make concrete commitments to ending it,” she added.
The real test of Democrats’ new mandate is whether they move beyond anti-war rhetoric and use their congressional power to deny the war further funding.
Netanyahu’s weakening position in Israel
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was a major driving force behind both rounds of war: Israel’s June 2025 attacks, which Washington later joined, and the joint US–Israeli campaign launched in February 2026. An investigation documented his preparations for the 2025 operation and efforts to bring Trump into the fighting.
This has been a Trump-Netanyahu war, with the Israeli prime minister serving as Trump’s principal regional partner. But Netanyahu lost his parliamentary majority in October’s elections, and rival Gadi Eisenkot has been tasked with forming a government. A political transition remains uncertain, and Netanyahu’s successor would not necessarily be less confrontational toward Iran.
Still, his weakened position threatens a partnership central to the war and could deprive Trump of his strongest Israeli ally in pursuing further escalation.
Wider diplomatic pressure
Qatar has emerged as a central mediator, with Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani engaging officials in Tehran and Washington, including Trump and Vance, to bridge differences over a ceasefire, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and reciprocal concessions.
Oman, a longtime US-Iran intermediary, is also working on de-escalation and maritime arrangements. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan – the so-called Mecca trio – have coordinated diplomatic outreach, including a visit to Tehran by senior officials. Pakistan also brings experience from the earlier Islamabad negotiations.
Russia and China have opposed renewed strikes. Both have intensified consultations with Iran and regional governments. While their roles differ from Qatar’s direct mediation, these efforts reflect broad international concern about another economic and security crisis.
Major disagreements remain over sanctions, the US naval blockade, nuclear restrictions, and security guarantees.
But regional powers, particularly those vulnerable to energy disruptions and retaliatory attacks, have strong incentives to prevent another confrontation. Their diplomatic engagement offers both sides alternatives to military escalation.
Iran’s pragmatism and deterrence
Tehran is celebrating the Republican defeat as vindication of its strategy to make Americans feel the economic consequences of war. Yet rather than exploiting that outcome to demand more, Iran is pursuing two parallel strategies: greater flexibility in negotiations and stronger military deterrence. Iran’s latest proposal shortens the timeline for reopening Hormuz from seven days to two, compared with its earlier New York initiative.
Tehran has also transmitted a new nuclear proposal through Qatar. Building on the Islamabad framework, these steps suggest pragmatism in seeking a negotiated exit without abandoning core demands. The other side is deterrence. Tehran believes it has established a new balance of power and warns that renewed US attacks will trigger retaliation far more devastating than in previous rounds.
“Iran believes it established deterrence and a new balance of power even before the US elections,” Kayhan Barzegar, dean of the Faculty of Law and Politics at Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch in Tehran, told The New Arab.
“The election results further strengthened Tehran’s determination to resist political pressure and military threats,” he added.
There is broad support across Iran’s political and security establishment for a forceful response to renewed attacks, according to Barzegar.
“Tehran believes it now knows how to respond more effectively and inflict far greater damage. Any further US military escalation will trigger a much harsher Iranian response against the US and its allies in the region.”
For Tehran, diplomatic flexibility and deterrence are complementary: negotiations offer an exit, while threats of a harsher regional response aim to discourage another attack. Whether Washington shares Iran’s assessment of the balance of power remains uncertain. Overconfidence on either side could itself trigger miscalculation. None of these developments rules out another US strike. Trump’s softer rhetoric could be tactical, and a diplomatic breakthrough remains elusive. But further escalation would now come amid electoral backlash, stronger congressional opposition, political uncertainty in Israel, mounting international pressure, and Iranian threats of a wider regional confrontation.
The ball is in Trump’s court. The possibility of escalation remains, but the price has risen exponentially.
Negar Mortazavi is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy
