Toplines
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) opened its third overseas military base, the China-Laos Military Joint Support and Training Center, in Ban Keun, Laos, on September 29, demonstrating strengthened People’s Republic of China (PRC)-Laos ties and expanding the PLA’s military presence in Southeast Asia.[1] This base constitutes the first PLA overseas military facility focused on air power, preceded by naval-focused PLA facilities in Djibouti and Cambodia.[2] The Laotian base contains runways as long as 6,562 feet, allowing it to be used for PLA Air Force (PLAAF) flights.[3] The base is located approximately 40 miles north of Laos’ capital, Vientiane, and close to the Laos-Thailand border.[4] The PRC Ministry of National Defense (MOD) stated that the base would be used to train Lao air force pilots and further PRC-Laos military cooperation.[5]
The PRC may be seeking to strengthen its historical alliances in Southeast Asia through new forms of military cooperation, following a June 5 agreement to enhance defense cooperation with Laos.[6] Laos and the PRC have maintained close ties since the late 1980s, with the PRC investing a total of $13 billion across 933 projects in Laos from 1989 to 2023, including infrastructure development, railways, and hydropower projects.[7] Laos maintains total debt exposure to the PRC amounting to $10.5 billion, or approximately 82 percent of Laos’ GDP, as of 2024.[8] These factors may have furthered Laos’ interest in developing a combined PRC-Laos military base on Laotian territory. The location of the new Laotian base also carries historical military significance, given its previous use as a tactical support site during the Laotian Civil War and Vietnam War era. The location of the new base could have been chosen in part to symbolize the strength of the PRC-Laos relationship.[9] The new base could further support PRC regional military activity, such as PRC-Thailand combined air exercises to include the annual Falcon Strike exercises.[10] The Lao PLA base is not yet equipped to provide the PLA with the ability to execute major combat operations, unlike US military bases. The base would give the PLA alternate routes to access disputed areas of the South China Sea and strategic air routes around Vietnam, however.[11]
The PRC may be surveying undersea communication cables near the Philippines’ Batanes Islands. The PRC may seek to reduce the islands’ utility to US and allied forces in a Taiwan contingency by cutting undersea cables and eroding Philippine sovereignty. Two PRC research vessels conducted undersea survey operations in the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) west of the Batanes Islands in September, according to ship-tracking data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence. Mu Shan Zi operated in the area from September 9 to 15, and Jia Hai Ke 7 has operated west of the Batanes since September 22, likely continuing the earlier survey. Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Jay Tarriela said that the Philippines detected Jia Hai Ke 7 using a dark vessel tracking platform on September 28 and confirmed its position visually with a maritime domain awareness flight.[12] Tarriela said the ship did not respond to radio challenges. The PCG deployed its largest ship, BRP Teresa Magbanua, and an Islander aircraft on October 1 to drive Jia Hai Ke 7 out of the Philippine EEZ.[13] China Coast Guard (CCG) ship 2503 arrived on the scene to escort Jia Hai Ke 7 around the same time, however, and tried to block the PCG’s mission.[14] CCG 2503 is one of two CCG ships that have continuously patrolled east of Taiwan since September 4.
The PCG said that Jia Hai Ke 7’s movement patterns indicated that it may have been surveying subsea cables.[15] Jia Hai Ke 7 is a privately owned research ship, but its apparent coordination with Mu Shan Zi and the CCG indicates that its survey operations were likely state-sanctioned.[16] The Batanes island chain spans most of the Luzon Strait between the Philippines and Taiwan, through which several undersea communication cables run.[17] The PRC very likely seeks to maximize its control of the strait during an invasion or blockade of Taiwan, as the strait is one of two major routes for PRC vessels to sail east of Taiwan. The PRC may seek to damage undersea internet cables around Taiwan to disrupt Taiwanese, Philippine, US, and other countries’ communications during a conflict. PRC ships have damaged Taiwanese undersea cables multiple times since 2023, and once caused a multi-week internet outage in Taiwan’s Matsu Islands.[18]
The PCG claimed that Jia Hai Ke 7 had illegally spoofed its signal to hide its location. The PCG claimed that Jia Hai Ke 7’s automatic identification signal (AIS) falsely showed it was sailing near Papua New Guinea, and not the Batanes Islands. ISW-CDOT was unable to verify the spoofing using Starboard data, however. The signal may have appeared to jump around due to data corruption or similar errors rather than deliberate spoofing, though PRC ships have used signal spoofing in other instances.[19]
The PRC embassy in Manila claimed that the ship was operating in waters where the PRC has “sovereignty and jurisdiction.”[20] PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times accused the PCG of “hyping” the research ship’s activities to undermine the PRC’s maritime rights.[21] The ship was operating inside the Philippines’ internationally recognized EEZ, but also within the Nine Dash Line, the PRC’s unrecognized boundary delineating its unilateral South China Sea claims.[22] The PRC has increasingly undermined Philippine sovereignty over the Batanes since at least June 2026 by promoting claims by academics and media that the Batanes are not legally part of the Philippines and are historically “associated” with Taiwan, and by extension part of the PRC.[23] PRC officials have neither endorsed nor enforced any claim of PRC sovereignty over the Batanes but may do so if the Philippines intervenes in a war to defend Taiwan.
Key Takeaways
- PRC Laos Overseas Military Base: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) opened its third overseas military base in Laos on September 29, the first People’s Liberation Army (PLA) overseas military base focused on airpower. The location of this base is likely intended to symbolize the strength of the PRC-Laos relationship and to support PRC regional military activity.
- PRC Undersea Surveillance: The PRC may be surveying undersea cables near the Philippines’ Batanes Islands, an island chain located near Taiwan. The PRC could disrupt communications between Taiwan, the Philippines, and other Taiwanese partners and allies in a future Taiwan contingency.
Cross-Strait Relations
Taiwan
Taiwan’s defense ministry proposed increasing its ammunition stockpile from a 30-day supply to a 120-day supply. The effort signifies Taiwan’s increasing attempts to prepare for military action by the PRC. Taiwanese media revealed a budget item within a new Ministry of National Defense (MND) budget proposal to spend $27.59 billion New Taiwan Dollars (NTD), about $868 million USD, in total to quadruple Taiwan’s stockpile over six years.[24] Taiwan’s MND already committed $7.3 billion NTD ($230 million USD) for the ammunition replenishment program as part of a 2026 supplemental budget that the Executive Yuan proposed on September 3, which would fund the program for the remainder of 2026.[25] Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) has yet to pass the supplemental budget, however.[26] The MND proposed a further $ 7.3 billion NTD ($229.22 million USD) to continue building up the stockpile in 2027 and will likely continue seeking funding on an annual basis through 2031.[27] The Executive Yuan originally included funding for 14 new munitions production lines in its 2026 special defense budget proposal, but that provision was ultimately cut from the version of the special budget passed in May.[28]
The MND said in March that it would focus on one-time purchases of tank ammunition, high explosives, autocannon rounds, and howitzer propellant charges before new munitions production lines are fully operational.[29] MND Strategic Planning Director Lieutenant General Huang Wen-chi said that current ammunition stocks require faster replenishment than in previous years due to increased use during Taiwanese military drills.[30]
Taiwan’s proposal to augment its ammunition stockpile highlights its efforts to prepare for PRC military aggression. A PRC invasion or blockade of Taiwan could disrupt Taiwan’s ability to import munitions and may destroy domestic defense manufacturing plants. The PRC has already drilled blockade capabilities, staging exercises in December 2025 that simulated cutting off Taiwan’s ports from external resupply.[31] Taiwan’s ability to resist PRC aggression depends on the endurance of its stockpiles or manufacturing capability of critical supplies and equipment during a contingency.
PRC chipmaking companies are operating in Taiwan without authorization to access Taiwanese chipmaking expertise and undermine Taiwan’s competitive advantage in semiconductors. The Taipei District Prosecutor’s Office indicted PRC chip firm Lontium Semiconductor Co.’s Taipei office head Lin Hao-yuan on October 1 for violating the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, which requires PRC companies to obtain government approval in order to legally operate in Taiwan.[32] Taiwanese prosecutors alleged that Lontium Chairman Chen Feng instructed Lin to rent a Taipei office in July 2024 and recruit Taiwanese engineers to work on semiconductor research and development, testing, and technical support.[33] Lontium’s revenue from operating in Taiwan since mid-2024 amounted to over NT$191 million, or roughly $6 million USD.[34] Lontium is known for its high-speed interface chips, and its Taiwanese clientele includes the biggest global contract notebook computer maker, Quanta Computer, and top global industrial PC (IPC) maker Advantech Co.[35]
Lin’s case is part of a broader 2025 Ministry of Justice probe into PRC companies illegally operating in Taiwan and poaching Taiwanese talent.[36] The Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) found that PRC companies illegally operating in Taiwan do so without approval — by registering operations under non-PRC nationals or hiring employees via HR and management firms to hide their direct involvement. Some Taiwanese employees at such companies have reported that they were unaware of their firm’s PRC affiliation due to the firm’s efforts to disguise its true ownership.[37] Lontium is one of sixteen companies that the MJIB investigated in July and August 2025.[38] All of the companies MJIB investigated are in the tech industry, and many of them specialize in high-tech fields. The firms are likely part of a broader PRC effort to access and co-opt Taiwan’s engineering talent pool and technical knowledge. The PRC is likely attempting to facilitate large-scale talent recruitment, technology transfer, and intellectual property (IP) theft consistent with its global economic espionage efforts. Taiwan’s irreplaceable high-tech expertise in areas such as semiconductors incentivizes other countries to oppose PRC aggression against Taiwan. The PRC therefore poses a national security threat to Taiwan by undermining Taiwan’s competitive advantage through economic espionage.
The PLA carried out 181 aerial incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in September, continuing the trend of reduced monthly incursions compared to 2024 and 2025. The monthly incursion total was significantly lower than in September 2024 and 2025, but similar to the average monthly volume for 2026.[39] The PLA doubled its volume of incursions to over 300 per month after Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te’s inauguration in May 2024 but appears to have reverted to numbers similar to the pre-Lai baseline since the start of 2026. The decline in monthly PLA sorties around Taiwan since the start of 2026 likely reflects an adjustment in the PRC’s coercion strategy targeting Taiwan, rather than seasonal fluctuations or other short-term factors. ISW-CDOT has previously assessed that the reduction in ADIZ incursions may free up PLA sorties and resources to focus on other military priorities and reestablish the utility of ADIZ incursions as a means of short-term political signaling.[40] A consistently high volume of ADIZ incursions also allows the PRC to degrade Taiwan’s threat awareness by desensitizing it to repeated aerial intrusions.
The CCG patrolled around Taiwan’s outlying islands and east of Taiwan in September — in line with its newly established “normal” patrol patterns. The CCG conducted four intrusive patrols into Taiwan-administered restricted waters around the Kinmen Islands, including two on September 8, one on September 10, and one on September 11.[41] A CCG ship circled Taiwan’s Pratas Island within the island’s contiguous zone for over 24 hours from September 7 to 8.[42] Two CCG ships patrolled continuously east of Taiwan throughout September, according to ship-tracking data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence.[43] The CCG’s four incursions around Kinmen, one patrol around Pratas, and round-the-clock patrols east of Taiwan are all consistent with the typical monthly patrol frequency that the CCG has normalized in each area since February 2024, February 2025, and June 2026, respectively. ISW-CDOT has assessed that the PRC seeks to assert its expanded jurisdiction and gradually normalize its presence and maritime activities in the waters east of Taiwan and around Taiwan’s outlying islands while eroding Taiwanese threat awareness.[44] These lines of effort allow the PRC to convince Taiwan and foreign countries to tolerate or comply with PRC “law enforcement” in those areas, which would improve the prospects of a PRC blockade or limited quarantine; deny other countries the exclusive use of those waters and their resources; improve undersea domain awareness for submarine warfare; and preposition undersea equipment such as sensors and weapons.
Northeast Asia
Japan
PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi and Vice Premier He Lifeng met with a Japanese trade promotion group visiting Beijing from September 27 to 30. The PRC is exerting economic, military, and diplomatic pressure on Japan to extract concessions from Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s government and convince other states not to support Taiwan rhetorically or militarily. Former Japanese Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi led a delegation from the Japanese Association for the Promotion of International Trade (JAPIT), a nongovernmental body that focuses on promoting Japan-PRC trade, to visit the PRC.[45] Wang told Iwaya that PRC-Japan ties are “once again facing a severe situation” and need to be “normalized once more.”[46] Wang stated that Japan’s “urgent task is to correct the erroneous words and actions of its leaders on the Taiwan issue as soon as possible,” referring to Takaichi’s statement in parliament in November 2025 that a PRC attack on Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan that would allow the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to mobilize.[47] He Lifeng criticized Japanese politicians for “challenging [the PRC’s] bottom line on the Taiwan issue” during his meeting with Iwaya but said that the two countries could overcome Takaichi’s “erroneous words and actions” and advance their economic relations.[48]
The PRC has implemented a range of coercive economic measures targeting Japan since Takaichi’s remarks, including export controls on rare earths and other dual-use goods, restrictions on PRC tourism to Japan, and severe tariffs on Japanese chemical exports to the PRC.[49] Senior PRC officials repeatedly told visiting Japanese delegations in 2026, including two legislative delegations that visited earlier in the year, that Takaichi’s comments on Taiwan were the main cause of deteriorating PRC-Japan relations and urged the delegations to push Takaichi to retract her remarks and influence the Japanese government to conform to the PRC’s stance on Taiwan.[50] PRC state media has also repeatedly called for Takaichi to retract her statement on Taiwan and has amplified domestic Japanese opposition to Takaichi.[51]
CCP officials and PRC state media often claim Takaichi’s stance on Taiwan and Japan’s military buildup represent a resurgence of Japanese “militarism,” referring to Imperial Japan’s aggressive expansionism during World War II.[52] ISW-CDOT has assessed that the PLA likely increased deployments to the Western Pacific to pressure Japan militarily after the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) upgraded a guided-missile cruiser to be able to launch US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles, announced that it would deploy advanced missile systems to its southwest coast and southwestern islands, and participated in combined naval drills with the Philippines and the United States in March and April.[53]
The PRC is likely harshly punishing Japan to deter other countries from voicing support for Taiwan. Beijing may not actually expect Takaichi to retract her statement, given that doing so would expose her to major domestic political backlash and undermine the credibility of Japan’s deterrence against PRC aggression. The PRC may also be seeking to extract a broader range of concessions from Japan, including a reduction in Japan’s rhetorical and diplomatic support for Taiwan and a slowdown or partial reversal of Japan’s military buildup.
[1] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/qwfb/16490186.html; https://m.sohu dot com/a/1083164905_120542825?scm=10001.325_13-325_13.0.0-0-0-0-0.5_1334 ; https://xinwen.bjd dot com.cn/content/s6abb4da9e4b0e42f8f00f85b.html; https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3369253/china-expands-overseas-military-presence-new-laos-air-force-centre?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection; https://www.bloomberg dot com/news/articles/2026-09-29/china-expands-military-footprint-with-new-support-base-in-laos
[2] https://m.sohu dot com/a/1083164905_120542825?scm=10001.325_13-325_13.0.0-0-0-0-0.5_1334; https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3369253/china-expands-overseas-military-presence-new-laos-air-force-centre?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection
[3] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3369253/china-expands-overseas-military-presence-new-laos-air-force-centre
[4] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-29/china-expands-military-footprint-with-new-support-base-in-laos; https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3369253/china-expands-overseas-military-presence-new-laos-air-force-centre?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection
[5] http://www.mod dot gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16490186.html
[6] https://un.china-mission dot gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202606/t20260608_11939180.htm; https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-carves-new-military-presence-southeast-asian-neighbour-2026-09-30/; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-indonesia-ministers-meet-friday-discuss-security-economic-issues-2026-08-20/
[7] https://jamestown.org/china-and-laos-an-uneasy-embrace/; https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/chinese-investment-02282024151635.html; https://thediplomat.com/2026/10/chinas-military-open-new-logistics-and-training-facility-in-laos/; https://www.rfa.org/english/special-reports/china-build-laos-dams/
[8] https://www.voanews dot com/a/hefty-debt-to-china-stokes-soaring-inflation-in-laos-/7885926.html
[9] https://thediplomat.com/2026/10/chinas-military-open-new-logistics-and-training-facility-in-laos/; https://jamestown.org/china-and-laos-an-uneasy-embrace/
[10] https://www.news dot cn/world/20260730/e46281ba0cb44fc4ae455f93213b65c1/c.html; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-29/china-expands-military-footprint-with-new-support-base-in-laos
[11] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-29/china-expands-military-footprint-with-new-support-base-in-laos; https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3369253/china-expands-overseas-military-presence-new-laos-air-force-centre?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection
[12] https://x.com/jaytaryela/status/2104533183857668135 ; https://x.com/jaytaryela/status/2105584800589627665
[13] https://x.com/jaytaryela/status/2105584800589627665
[14] https://x.com/jaytaryela/status/2105584800589627665
[15] https://www.philstar dot com/headlines/2026/09/29/2559694/pcg-challenges-china-ships-mindoro-batanes
[16] https://www.bairdmaritime.com/work-boat-world/research-environment-training/vessel-review-jiahaike-7-dp2-capable-research-ship-to-be-deployed-in-chinese-offshore-waters
[17] https://www.submarinecablemap.com/
[18] https://globaltaiwan.org/2025/06/taiwans-digital-vulnerabilities/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-october-3-2025/
[20] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202609/1371582.shtml
[21] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202609/1371582.shtml
[22] https://x.com/SCS_PI/status/2105623848586825863
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-july-17-2026/ ; https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202609/1369729.shtml ; https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202607/1365585.shtml
[24] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3369212/taiwan-plans-us850-million-ammunition-spend-prepare-potential-pla-blockade
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-september-11-2026/
[26] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/09/29/2003865069; https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3369212/taiwan-plans-us850-million-ammunition-spend-prepare-potential-pla-blockade ; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-september-11-2026/
[27] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3369212/taiwan-plans-us850-million-ammunition-spend-prepare-potential-pla-blockade
[29] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/09/29/2003865069
[30] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3369212/taiwan-plans-us850-million-ammunition-spend-prepare-potential-pla-blockade
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-special-report-december-31-2025/
[32] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6450117
[33] https://focustaiwan dot tw/society/202610010006
[34] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6450117
[35] https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6450117; https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/biz/archives/2025/06/12/2003838447
[36] https://www.mjib.gov dot tw/news/Details/1/1116
[37] https://restofworld.org/2026/taiwan-china-chip-investigations/
[38] https://www.mjib dot gov.tw/news/Details/1/1116; https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/10/02/2003865259
[39] https://x.com/MoNDefense?lang=en ; https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?gid=1177684118#gid=1177684118
[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-march-20-2026/
[41] https://www.cga.gov dot tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=168933&ctNode=650&mp=999 ; https://www.cga.gov dot tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=168960&ctNode=650&mp=999 ; https://www.cga.gov dot tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=168966&ctNode=650&mp=999
[42] https://www.cga.gov dot tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=168917&ctNode=650&mp=999
[43] https://www.news dot cn/tw/20260929/52dcbe2222254e74ad89e33d659b3d0b/c.html
[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/the-prc-normalizes-law-enforcement-east-of-taiwan/
[45] https://asia.nikkei dot com/politics/international-relations/japanese-trade-promotion-group-led-by-ex-foreign-minister-visits-china; https://www.japantimes.co dot jp/news/2026/09/29/japan/politics/china-foreign-minister-japan-iwaya/
[46] https://asia.nikkei dot com/politics/international-relations/japan-china-tensions/china-s-wang-tells-ex-japan-minister-ties-need-to-be-normalized; https://www.news dot cn/world/20260929/26acc4480a4b45e397ead89e0f31c682/c.html; https://www.japantimes.co dot jp/news/2026/09/29/japan/politics/china-foreign-minister-japan-iwaya/
[47] https://asia.nikkei dot com/politics/international-relations/japan-china-tensions/china-s-wang-tells-ex-japan-minister-ties-need-to-be-normalized; https://www.news dot cn/world/20260929/26acc4480a4b45e397ead89e0f31c682/c.html; https://asia.nikkei dot com/politics/japan-s-new-pm/japan-s-takaichi-wades-into-taiwan-issue-breaking-with-past-governments
[49] https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-september-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-september-11-2026/; https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-april-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-april-24-2026/; https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-february-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-february-6-2026/
[50] https://asia.nikkei dot com/politics/international-relations/japan-china-tensions/china-s-policy-toward-japan-remains-unchanged-ccp-official-says; https://asia.nikkei dot com/politics/international-relations/japan-china-tensions/japan-china-ties-wither-as-trump-readies-red-carpet-for-xi-jinping; https://asia.nikkei dot com/politics/international-relations/japan-china-tensions/china-s-wang-tells-ex-japan-minister-ties-need-to-be-normalized; https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202608/1369196.shtml; https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202609/1370567.shtml; https://www.news dot cn/world/20260929/26acc4480a4b45e397ead89e0f31c682/c.html
[51] https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-february-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-february-6-2026/; https://www.chinadaily.com dot cn/a/202610/01/WS6abdb00ee4b06d4aa05611a6.html; https://www.chinadaily.com dot cn/a/202609/29/WS6abbbaafe4b06d4aa0560dce.html; https://en.people dot cn/n3/2026/0916/c90000-20500138.html
[52] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202609/t20260929_12033332.shtml; https://www.chinadaily.com dot cn/a/202608/07/WS6a753c29a310986e2b46986c.html; https://www.qstheory dot cn/20260611/419e8b00b4e44b25865dba8c4581ac39/c.html; https://www.news dot cn/world/20260529/da0b14de89da46d38cfd5840fb366791/c.html
[53] https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-april-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-april-24-2026/; https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-april-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-april-17-2026/; https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-april-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-april-3-2026/
